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Settling the Scienter Split:  
Why Scienter Should Not Be Required for  
SEC Enforcement of Rule 13b2-2 Violations 
Robert Strongarone* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“When misinformation causes loss, it is small comfort to the investor 
to know that he has been bilked by negligent mistake rather than by 
fraudulent design, particularly when recovery of his loss has been 
foreclosed by this Court’s decisions.”1  Courts have been analyzing various 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) rules since the SEC was 
established, to determine on a rule-by-rule basis, if scienter2 is an element 
that the Commission must prove in order to prevail in civil enforcement 
actions.3 
In early 2008, executives of Thornburg Mortgage (Thornburg), a 
publicly traded company, disseminated information to auditors to prepare 
the company’s 2007 form 10-K.4 Thornburg had a tough year in 2007; the 
weakening real estate market decreased the company’s investment values, 
resulting in margin calls on its investment loans.5  Despite this, the 
executives prepared a letter to Thornburg’s outside auditor overstating the 
financial condition of the company.6  Based on this information, the 
auditors agreed that the losses were temporary and did not need to be 
disclosed to shareholders.7  Over the course of the year, asset values 
 
 *    B.S. Florida International University; J.D. Candidate 2015, Florida International University 
College of Law.  I thank my family for their support, and Professor Alex Pearl and the Law Review 
editors for their valuable input and support.  Any errors are mine alone. 
1  Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 716 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  In a suit brought by the 
SEC for injunctive relief for a violation of Rule 17(a)(2) or 17(a)(3), the Court held that the SEC was 
required to establish scienter.  Justice Blackmun dissented based on statutory interpretation and 
congressional intent. 
2  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (9th ed. 2009) (defining scienter as “a degree of knowledge 
that makes a person legally responsible for the consequences of his or her act or omission; the fact of an 
act’s having been done knowingly, especially as a ground for civil damages or criminal punishment”). 
3 See generally SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963); Ernst & Ernst 
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 188 (1976); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980). 
4  SEC v. Goldstone, 952 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1077 (2013). 
5  See generally Patrick Fitzgerald, Judge Says SEC Can Proceed with Thornburg Mortgage 
Fraud Suit, WALL ST. J. (July 9, 2013, 2:03 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424127887323368704578595811853715032. 
6  Goldstone, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 1086. 
7  Id. at 1093. 
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continued falling, and in May of 2009, Thornburg filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy protection, resulting in a total loss for investors holding 
common shares.8 
The SEC brought multiple claims against the executives, including one 
under SEC Rule 13b2-2.9  The Commission alleged that the executives: (1) 
failed to disclose that the company was struggling to meet margin calls; (2) 
took temporary measures to ward off margin calls; and (3) would be forced 
to sell investments at a loss due to the impending hedge fund collapse.10 
The executives mounted a defense based on a lack of scienter.11  They 
argued that the SEC failed to prove that they disregarded obvious “risks of 
misleading investors,” failed to allege facts demonstrating the executives 
“believed the statements in the 10-K were false or misleading at the time 
they were made,” and failed to prove that they “prepared the 10-K with any 
intent to defraud investors.”12  Interoffice e-mails document the executives’ 
awareness that the information provided to the accountants was 
misleading.13 
This kind of communication by Thornburg’s executives is problematic 
under SEC regulations.  SEC Rule 13b2-2 was enacted to prevent the 
communication of misinformation to accountants in connection with audits 
or SEC filings.14  By signing the letter to the auditors, the executives 
functionally ratified the information contained in the letter.  Whether or not 
the SEC could prove an intent to mislead the accountants, the executives 
became responsible when they signed the letter.  By eliminating negligence 
as a defense for violations of Rule 13b2-2, executives are forced to make 
themselves aware of the content they are certifying and to ensure that it is 
correct.  This is important to protect investors and to hold executives 
accountable for both negligent and intentionally fraudulent actions. 
Rule 13b2-2 provides that “no director or officer shall, directly or 
indirectly . . . [m]ake or cause to be made a materially false or misleading 
statement to an accountant . . . .”15  The Rule extends to information 
provided to accountants and auditors who produce the filings which public 
companies are required to file with the SEC.16  Investors directly and 
 
8  Id. 
9  Id. at 1088. 
10  Id. at 1091-92. 
11  Id. at 1103. 
12  Id. at 1094. 
13  Id. at 1086. 
14  See generally Representations and Conduct in Connection with the Preparation of Required 
Reports and Documents, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2 (2015). 
15  17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2(a) (2015). 
16  17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2(b)(1) (2015). 
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indirectly rely on the integrity of the data contained in these filings when 
purchasing securities.17  Direct reliance occurs when investors review 
company financial reports and releases to make investment decisions.18  
Indirect reliance is assumed based on the efficient capital market theory.19 
The federal circuit courts of appeals are currently split on the issue of 
whether the SEC should be required to prove scienter in Rule 13b2-2 civil 
enforcement actions.20  This article will demonstrate that, because the SEC 
and the investing public rely on the data provided to accountants and 
auditors, the SEC should not be required to prove the element of scienter 
when enforcing Rule 13b2-2 in civil actions.  Holding directors and officers 
to a negligence standard will discourage carelessness and ensure that 
accountants receive accurate information, which is in the best interests of 
the investing public.21 
To set the stage, Section I(A) will begin by explaining why the SEC 
was created.  An analysis of the legislative intent behind the enabling 
statute for Rule 13b2-2, and a discussion of the SEC’s purpose for drafting 
Rule 13b2-2 follow.  The legislature and the SEC’s intent are essential to 
the argument against a scienter requirement.  The article continues with an 
in-depth discussion of the Ninth and Second Circuit cases representing the 
two leading interpretations of Rule 13b2-2 with respect to scienter in 
Sections II and III respectively.  Section IV examines recent laws passed by 
Congress to show that the concerns that originally gave rise to Rule 13b2-2 
still exist.  Section IV also highlights recent legislation in light of the 
economic crises this country has experienced and the legislation created in 
its wake.  Deference to agency interpretations, including the Chevron and 
Skidmore doctrines, provide context for the legal basis concerning 
deference to the SEC interpretation of its own rules.  Finally, the Section V 
summarizes the analysis, concluding that the SEC should not be required to 
prove scienter when enforcing Rule 13b2-2. 
A.  Creation of the SEC 
Beginning in the late 1920s and lasting approximately ten years, the 
Great Depression was a severe economic downturn causing rampant 
 
17  Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 108 S. Ct. 978, 989 (1988) (citing Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 
1160-61 (3d. Cir. 1986)). 
18  See id. at 980. 
19  Id. at 991 n.24 (explaining that the efficient capital market theory means that “market 
professionals generally consider most publicly announced material statements about companies, thereby 
affecting stock market prices”). 
20  See SEC v. Goldstone, 952 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1212 (2013) (discussing the split between the 
Second and Ninth Circuits). 
21  See Byron F. Egan, Major Themes of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 42 TEX. J. BUS. L. 333, 430-33 
(2008). 
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unemployment and stock market declines.22  While the reasons for the 
depression are debated, varied, and mostly beyond the scope of this article, 
manipulation of the securities markets was a contributing factor.23  In the 
wake of the Great Depression, securities and banking legislation was 
enacted to increase transparency and prevent the scenarios that contributed 
to the economic decline from recurring.24  The Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 was passed during this period and was the legislation that created the 
SEC.25 
The SEC is an independent administrative agency26 of the Executive 
Branch of the United States Government.27  The Commission’s original 
purpose was to restore investor confidence by ensuring that the companies, 
brokers, and exchanges disseminated honest information, putting investors’ 
interests before their own.28  The current mission statement of the 
Commission is “to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient 
markets, and facilitate capital formation.”29  The SEC uses a number of key 
functions to carry out its mission.30  The Commission interprets existing 
federal securities laws and creates new rules to further its goals.31  The 
Commission provides oversight of broker-dealers, ratings agencies, and 
self-regulatory organizations (“SRO”) and enforces securities laws and 
rules.32 
B.  SEC Rulemaking 
The SEC creates rules within the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”) guidelines.33  Rules are usually created at the direction of an 
enabling act34 or one of the rulemaking divisions within the Commission: 
 
22  Joy Sabino Mullane, Perfect Storms: Congressional Regulation of Executive Compensation, 
57 VILL. L. REV. 589, 594 (2012). 
23  Norman S. Poser, Stock Market Manipulation and Corporate Control Transactions, 40 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 671, 690 (1986). 
24  Mullane, supra note 22, at 600-01. 
25  Id. at 601. 
26  Daniel J. Gifford, Adjudication in Independent Tribunals: The Role of an Alternative Agency 
Structure, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965, 969 (1991). 
27  See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, 
and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/
about/whatwedo.shtml [hereinafter U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N]. 
28  See id. 
29  See id. 
30  See id. 
31  See id. 
32  See id. 
33  See Renee M. Jones, Legitimacy and Corporate Law: The Case for Regulatory Redundancy, 
86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1273, 1311 (2009). 
34  See id. at 1312. 
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the Market Regulation, Corporate Finance, or Investment Management 
divisions.35  As in other administrative contexts, the rulemaking process 
consists of three general steps.36  First, the Commission may begin with a 
concept release, outlining a problem that needs to be solved and seeking 
proposed solutions from the public to remedy the problem.37  Next, the 
APA requires the Commission to publish a proposed rule in the Federal 
Register.38  Interested parties are given an opportunity to voice support for 
or concerns about the proposed rule and to participate in the rulemaking 
process.39  The final rule, including any changes proposed and accepted 
during the notice and comment period, is then published in the Federal 
Register.40 
C.  SEC Investigation and Enforcement 
Many types of conduct can trigger an SEC investigation of potential 
SEC rule violations.41  The SEC engages in market surveillance, receives 
tips and complaints from investors, and coordinates with other 
governmental entities to uncover possible rule violations and initiate 
investigations.42  A thorough investigation is conducted using methods such 
as reviewing financial records and interviewing associated parties.43  After a 
case is developed, it is presented to the Commissioners to decide what, if 
any, remedy should be sought.44 
The SEC may pursue various remedies to thwart ongoing violations of 
law or seek justice for violations that have occurred.45  The SEC is limited 
to civil enforcement of the federal securities laws.46  A panoply of remedial 
mechanisms exist: a cease and desist order to stop ongoing activities, an 
injunction to prevent future violations, monetary penalties (fines) to punish 
and discourage future violations, and disgorgement to prevent unjust 
enrichment from ill-gotten gains.47  Criminal enforcement may be sought 
 
35  David S. Ruder, Balancing Investor Protection with Capital Formation Needs After the SEC 
Chamber of Commerce Case, 26 PACE L. REV. 39, 52 (2005). 
36  See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 27. 
37  See id. 
38  5 U.S.C. § 553 (2015). 
39  Id. 
40  Id. 
41  See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 27. 
42  Id. 
43  See id. 
44  See id. 
45  Griffin Finan et al., Securities Fraud, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1129, 1183 (2011). 
46  Id. at 1183. 
47  Rebecca Gross et al., Securities Fraud, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1213, 1266-72 (2012) 
(discussing remedies that the SEC can seek). 
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only through another agency like the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), with 
or without SEC involvement.48 
D.  The History of Rule 13b2-2 
The focus here is on a specific SEC Rule: 13b2-2.  Concern for the 
accuracy of financial statements was addressed in section 11 of the original 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.49  Section 11 allowed for investors to sue 
directors and officers for rescission or damages for losses resulting from 
material misinformation or omissions.50  Showing a reasonable belief in the 
information when it was communicated allows directors and officers to 
avoid liability.51  The same is true today.52 
In the 1970s, a Watergate Special Prosecutor’s investigation uncovered 
hundreds of illegal bribes by domestic corporations to foreign political 
officials.53  The SEC suggested a new set of rules to supplement the 1934 
Act to, among other things, “prohibit the making of false, misleading or 
incomplete statements to an accountant in connections with any 
examination or audit” used to cover up such bribes.54  As a result, Congress 
adopted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977, and created section 
13(b)(2) of the 1934 Act. 
Born from this new legislation, Rule 13b2-2 was intended to 
“encourage careful and accurate communications between auditors and 
issuers from whom they request information during the audit process, deter 
the making of false, misleading or incomplete statements to accountants, 
and thereby enhance the integrity of the financial disclosure system.”55  
During the notice and comment period for the original Rule, commenters 
expressed concern for the lack of a scienter requirement.56  The 
Commission responded that a scienter requirement would be inconsistent 
with section 13(b)(2), which indicated no congressional intent to impose a 
scienter requirement.57 
The enabling statute for the modern Rule 13b2-2 is section 303(a) of 
 
48  Id. at 1275. 
49  John Hanna, The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 23 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6 (1934). 
50  Id. 
51  Id. 
52  Id. 
53  Promotion of the Reliability of Financial Information and Prevention of the Concealment of 
Questionable or Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices, Exchange Act Release No. 15,570, 16 SEC 
Docket 1143 (Feb. 15, 1979). 
54  Id. at 3. 
55  Id. at 10. 
56  Id. at 12. 
57  Id. at 10. 
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the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”).58  It was created in the 
wake of the stock market decline and accounting scandals which marked 
the first two years of the new millennium.59  A number of well-known 
publicly traded companies filed for bankruptcy protection during this 
period, including Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Adelphia 
Communications, and Tyco International.60  These corporations perpetrated 
accounting fraud in cooperation with large accounting firms, costing 
investors billions of dollars and eroding the public confidence in the 
securities markets.61  Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley in response to the 
accounting fraud, market decline, and drop in investor confidence to 
prevent a repeat of history.62 
In furtherance of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC initiated rulemaking to 
create Rule 13b2-2, intended to replace Rule 13B-2.63  Rule 13b2-2 was 
proposed on October 18, 2002.64  After a notice and comment period, the 
Rule was enacted on June 26, 2003.65  The new Rule is composed of three 
sections. 
1.  Rule 13b2-2(a) 
Section (a) prohibits directors or officers of an issuer from directly or 
indirectly making material false statements or omissions to accountants in 
connection with audits or financial statements intended for audit purposes 
or for SEC filings.66 
2.  Rule 13b2-2(b) 
Section (b) prohibits directors, officers, or persons acting on their 
behalf to “coerce, manipulate, mislead, or fraudulently influence” 
accountants if they “knew or should have known” that it would result in 
misleading financial statements.67  This includes issuing reports that do not 
 
58  17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2 (2015). 
59  Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1153 (2004). 
60  Id.; see also Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1544-45 (2005) (listing the companies that went bankrupt during this 
time period). 
61  Kevin Rubinstein, Internal Whistleblowing and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 806: Balancing the 
Interests of Employee and Employer, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 637, 638 (2007). 
62  Id. 
63  Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, 68 Fed. Reg. 31,820-01, 31,820 (Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n May 29, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) [hereinafter Improper Influence]. 
64  See id at 31,859 n.4. 
65  See id at 31,820. 
66  17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2(a) (2015). 
67  17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2(b)(1) (2015) (emphasis added). 
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conform to generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”), failing to 
report in violation of GAAP, and failing to disclose or withdraw a report 
after it has been deemed misleading. 
3.  Rule 13b2-2(c) 
Section (c) of the Rule applies the same standards applied in sections 
(a) and (b) to investment companies registered under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940.68 
E.  What is Scienter? 
The Supreme Court has defined scienter as “intent to deceive, 
manipulate, or defraud.”69  Black’s Law Dictionary defines scienter as “a 
degree of knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for the 
consequences of his or her act or omission.”70  Recklessness can also 
constitute scienter.71  The conduct of a corporate officer is reckless when 
that officer is acting with an “extreme departure from the standards of 
ordinary care” and in a way that can cause misleading information to reach 
the investing public, if the danger that misleading information can reach the 
investing public is known or when the danger is so clear that it should have 
been known.72 
Proving scienter requires a demonstration of the defendant’s state of 
mind.73  For the SEC to prevail in an enforcement action which contains a 
scienter element, the Commission must show that the defendant knew or 
should have known that their act or omission was fraudulent.74  Scienter is 
typically the most difficult element of a crime to prove because of the 
difficulty in proving a state of mind.75 
Complexities in proving scienter make it the element defendants 
frequently use as a basis for dismissal of charges.76  Complications arise 
when a representative, genuinely ignorant of the falsity of the information 
provided to them, disseminates the false information.77  The theory of 
 
68  17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2(c) (2015). 
69  Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). 
70  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2. 
71  SEC v. Dain Rauscher Inc., 254 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2001). 
72  Id. at 856. 
73  Ryan G. Meist, Would the Real Scienter Please Stand Up: The Effect of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on Pleading Securities Fraud, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1105 (1998). 
74  Id. 
75  Id. 
76  Browning Jeffries, The Implications of Janus on Issuer Liability in Jurisdictions Rejecting 
Collective Scienter, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 491, 494 (2013). 
77  Id. 
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collective scienter attempts to remedy this situation.78  Collective scienter 
attributes the requisite scienter to the organization as a whole when the 
individuals perpetrating the underlying fraud cannot be identified.79  Many 
jurisdictions reject collective scienter and continue to require the scienter of 
the individual asserting the fraudulent information to be proven.80 
A comparison of scienter with conceptions of mens rea relevant to 
criminal cases illuminates distinctions and the ultimate problems associated 
with the incorporation of a scienter requirement in Rule 13b2-2.  
Historically, the state of mind of the accused has been an important element 
in the United States’ system of justice.81  Lawmakers have often included 
the words “willful” and “malicious” in criminal statutes to establish intent, 
or mens rea82 required for a conviction.83  Mens rea has a broader scope of 
culpability than scienter.84  Negligence is the broadest tier of mens rea, 
creating culpability when the actor “should be aware of a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk.”85  Recklessness builds on negligence by specifying a 
heightened requirement of “conscious disregard” of the substantial and 
unjustifiable risk.86  Knowledge creates further culpability because the actor 
is “aware that it is practically certain that [the] conduct will cause a certain 
result.”87  The most culpable level of mens rea is purpose—consciously 
engaging in some conduct with the intention of causing the result.88 
Mens rea is a legal element of crime intended to protect the public 
from undeserved punishment.89  Scienter is analogous to mens rea and is 
typically required in civil cases.90  Unlike mens rea, scienter does not 
include culpability for negligence.91  Knowledge requirements have their 
roots in the common law.92  Courts relied on the level of a defendant’s 
 
78  Id. at 494-95. 
79  Id. at 495. 
80  Id. 
81  Michael L. Seigel, Bringing Coherence to Mens Rea Analysis for Securities-Related Offenses, 
2006 WIS. L. REV. 1563, 1564 (2006). 
82  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 1006 (defining mens rea as: [Law Latin “guilty 
mind”] (1861) “The state of mind that the prosecution, to secure a conviction, must prove that a 
defendant had when committing a crime; criminal intent or recklessness”). 
83  Seigel, supra note 81, at 1564. 
84  Id. at 1571. 
85  Id. at 1572 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985)). 
86  Id. 
87  Id. 
88  Id. 
89  Id. at 1569. 
90  Id. at 1604. 
91  SEC v. Dain Rauscher Inc., 254 F.3d 852, 856 (9th Cir. 2001). 
92  Jeanne P. Bolger, Recklessness and the Rule 10b-5 Scienter Standard After Hochfelder, 49 
FORDHAM L. REV. 817, 822 (1981). 
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knowledge and intent to determine culpability and the severity of the 
sentence, if any.93  Accordingly, one who causes the death of another may 
have committed murder, but, because of a lack of intent, may be acquitted.94  
Similarly, for securities fraud charges requiring proof of scienter, the 
accused can escape liability by showing a lack of scienter.95 
Of course, criminal charges of any kind can be brought by 
governmental entities only; individuals cannot bring criminal charges.96  
Violation of criminal laws generally results in the loss of life, liberty, 
property, or a combination thereof.97  Civil suits can be brought by 
governments or by individuals.98  Civil remedies can be loss of property in 
the form of fines or injunctive relief, but not imprisonment.99  Civil laws 
can be broken down further into two classes: those that include a private 
cause of action and those that can be enforced only by the government.100  
Civil laws that include a private cause of action may include elements to 
protect individuals from frivolous lawsuits designed to compel a 
settlement.101  Civil laws lacking a private cause of action exist to allow the 
government to protect the public and enforce laws; such laws may have 
lower pleading requirements and fewer elements to prove.102 
F.  A Point of Confusion 
While seemingly similar, there is an important distinction to be made 
between fraud charges relating to GAAP non-compliance and charges 
brought for a violation of Rule 13b2-2.  Generally, scienter is an element 
that must be proven to prevail on fraud charges in relation to GAAP non-
compliance.103  Simply publishing inaccurate information may not 
 
93  Id. at 822-23. 
94  See, e.g., Regina v. Cunningham, 41 Crim. App. 155 (1957). 
95  See generally SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Goyal, 629 F.3d 
912 (9th Cir. 2010). 
96  John Bronsteen et al., Happiness and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1037-38 (2009) 
(contrasting criminal and civil suits); see also Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 85 (1981) (affirming 
lower court holding that “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or 
non-prosecution of another”). 
97  See also Meghan J. Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1231 (discussing 
death penalty); see generally Leeke, 454 U.S. at 85. 
98  Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 
101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1814 (1992). 
99  Id. at 1812. 
100  Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence of Implied 
Private Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861, 861 (1996). 
101  Mann, supra note 98, at 1814. 
102  Dain C. Donelson & Robert A. Prentice, Scienter Pleading and Rule 10b-5: Empirical 
Analysis and Behavioral Implications, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 441, 448 (2012). 
103  SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1218 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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necessarily prove scienter, but significant violations may indicate 
scienter.104  An important distinction to make is that Rule 13b2-2 is not a 
rule about accounting and proper accounting methods.105  Instead the Rule 
forbids making false statements or material omissions with respect to the 
company’s financials to accountants preparing reports for the SEC or for 
audit purposes.106  Therefore to analogize Rule 13b2-2 to the scienter 
requirement for GAAP violations is improper.  This Rule is about 
communication and withholding information, not the methods used by the 
accountants to arrive at their reported results. 
II.  THE NINTH CIRCUIT CASE HISTORY 
Current precedent in the Ninth Circuit requires the SEC to prove 
scienter to prevail on a Rule 13b2-2 action.107  The most recent case from 
the Ninth Circuit is SEC v. Todd, which relied heavily on United States v. 
Goyal.108 
A.  United States v. Goyal 
Goyal, decided in 2010, was a criminal case brought by the United 
States Attorney’s Office in the Northern District of California against 
Prabhat Goyal, the CFO of NAI, a security software firm.109  Goyal was 
charged with, among other things, violations of Rule 13b2-2.110  The 
government contended that Goyal made materially false statements to 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (“PwC”), the outside auditors to NAI.111 
In 1998, NAI expanded from a direct sales distribution method by 
entering into sales agreements with distribution companies.112  The 
government took issue with NAI’s recording of revenue from these sales 
agreements, asserting that NAI prematurely recognized the revenues to be 
received and causing revenue to be overstated on the company’s financial 
reports.113  Specifically, Goyal was accused of misleading PwC in letters he 
signed attesting that NAI’s accounting conformed with GAAP and that NAI 
 
104  Id. (citing Dannenberg v. Painewebber Inc. (In re Software Toolworks Inc.), 50 F.3d 615, 
627 (1994)). 
105  See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2 (2015). 
106  See generally id. 
107  Todd, 642 F.3d at 1225. 
108  See id. at 1219. 
109  See generally United States v. Goyal, 629 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 2010). 
110  Id. at 914. 
111  Id. 
112  Id. at 913. 
113  Id. at 914. 
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disclosed all sales terms.114 
A jury convicted Goyal on seven counts of making materially false 
statements to PwC.115 Upon the district court’s denial of Goyal’s motion for 
judgment of acquittal and for a new trial, Goyal brought an appeal before 
the Ninth Circuit.116  The court, interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 78, held that the 
government was required to prove scienter, that is, show Goyal knew his 
statements were false, for him to be criminally liable.117  Analyzing Rule 
13b2-2, the court noted “[c]riminal liability under Rule 13b2-2 therefore 
also requires that a false statement to an auditor be made knowingly.”118  
The Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court, holding that 
the government had failed to prove that Goyal knowingly deceived NAI’s 
auditors, and therefore, as a matter of law, a jury could not have found him 
guilty.119 
B.  SEC v. Todd 
In 2011, the Ninth Circuit decided SEC v. Todd.120  In Todd, the SEC 
sued Todd, Weitzen, and Manza, the CFO, CEO, and controller, 
respectively, of Gateway, a computer manufacturer and retailer.121  As 
controller, Manza was responsible for preparing Gateway’s financial 
statements.122  Todd’s responsibilities included reviewing and signing the 
company’s financial reports.123  Weitzen and Todd participated in a 
conference call touting “accelerating revenue growth,” and Weitzen 
prepared a press release stating the company had experienced “accelerated 
year-over-year revenue growth.”124  Amid a weakening demand for 
personal computers and record revenue reports by the company, the SEC 
investigated Gateway’s claims.125 
During fiscal year 2000, a number of transactions were recorded 
improperly, artificially inflating revenue.126  Gateway sold fixed assets to 
another company, Lockheed, which then leased the assets back to 
 
114  Id. at 916. 
115  Id. at 914. 
116  Id. 
117  Id. at 916. 
118  Id. at 922 n.6 (emphasis added). 
119  Id. at 922-23. 
120  See generally SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2011). 
121  Id. at 1212. 
122  Id. at 1213. 
123  Id. at 1212. 
124  Id. at 1213. 
125  Id. 
126  Id. at 1213-14. 
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Gateway.127  Nevertheless, Gateway recorded the asset sale as revenue, a 
violation of GAAP.128  Gateway had a sales agreement with VenServ that 
required a minimum number of referrals before Gateway would receive 
payment.129  Gateway had not yet met the threshold, and accordingly had 
not yet been paid, but still reported the anticipated revenue.130  An 
agreement with America Online (“AOL”) was modified, changing the 
timing of payments to Gateway, resulting in a $72 million revenue boost.131  
The officers failed to disclose that this was not sustainable revenue growth, 
but instead a one-time transaction.132 
The SEC brought a suit against Todd and Manza alleging, among other 
things, a violation of Rule 13b2-2 for preparing and delivering false 
financial statements to PwC, Gateway’s outside accountant and auditor.133  
Weitzen’s alleged violation of Rule 13b2-2 stemmed from his signing the 
statements delivered to PwC.134 
On the Rule 13b2-2 claim, the district court granted summary 
judgment for Weitzen.135  A jury found Todd and Manza liable for violating 
Rule 13b2-2, but the district court granted motions as a matter of law to set 
aside the jury verdict.136  The SEC appealed the district court decisions.137 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, relying on United States v. Goyal, 
asserted that scienter was an element of Rule 13b2-2138 and affirmed 
summary judgment in favor of Weitzen.139  The court held that the SEC 
failed to prove scienter because it had not shown Weitzen had knowledge of 
the improperly booked transactions.140  Similarly, Todd and Manza’s 
judgments were affirmed because, based on the facts presented by the SEC, 
they did not know the letter to PwC was a false representation of the 
company’s financials; they therefore lacked scienter.141  Vital to the analysis 
of these two cases is that the court failed to distinguish between the criminal 
liability that Goyal was facing and the civil liability of Todd, Manza, and 
 
127  Id. 
128  Id. at 1213. 
129  Id. at 1214. 
130  Id. 
131  See id. 
132  Id. 
133  Id. at 1219. 
134  Id. at 1224. 
135  Id. at 1214. 
136  Id. 
137  Id. 
138  Id. at 1220, 1224. 
139  Id. at 1224. 
140  Id. 
141  Id. at 1219. 
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Weitzen. 
III.  THE SECOND CIRCUIT CASE HISTORY 
The Second Circuit is home to Wall Street—the financial hub of the 
Americas, if not the world.142  Accordingly, many securities-related cases 
arise in the Second Circuit.143 
A.  SEC v. McNulty 
In 1998, the Second Circuit decided SEC v. McNulty.144  McNulty 
controlled two auto parts businesses, which raised a combined total of 
seventy-eight million dollars from investors between 1988 and 1990.145  
Portions of the funds raised by McNulty were diverted to other entities 
controlled by McNulty.146  This information was not communicated to 
investors.147  John Shanklin, a co-defendant, was an officer and director of 
both auto parts businesses, and was responsible for both companies’ 
accounting and SEC filings.148 
The SEC alleged that Shanklin misrepresented or concealed the 
diverting of funds away from their intended purpose.149  Further, they 
asserted that Shanklin knew or was reckless in failing to know about the 
misrepresentations.150  After failing to file an answer to the allegations, the 
court entered a default judgment against Shanklin and McNulty.151 
Shanklin hired new counsel, and moved to vacate the default judgment 
against him.152  He argued that, among other things, the SEC did not prove 
all elements of the claim because it failed to prove that he acted with 
scienter.153  Although Shanklin admitted to signing false and incomplete 
disclosure forms for the SEC, he denied involvement in raising funds or 
knowledge of any misstatements in corporate filings.154  The court held that 
section 13 of the 1934 Act and the SEC rules established thereunder “are 
 
142  Shaun Mulreed, Private Securities Litigation Reform Failure: How Scienter Has Prevented 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 from Achieving Its Goals, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
779, 807 (2005). 
143  Id. at 807. 
144  SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732 (2d. Cir. 1998). 
145  Id. at 734. 
146  Id. 
147  Id. 
148  Id. 
149  See id. 
150  Id. 
151  Id. at 735. 
152  Id. 
153  Id. 
154  See id. 
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provisions under which civil liability may be imposed without proof of 
scienter.”155  The court quoted its original opinion, describing Shanklin as a 
“sophisticated businessman,” agreeing that he should be “responsible for 
the accuracy of the information” in the filings he signed.156  The court held 
that Shanklin could not escape liability for misinformation contained in 
filings that he signed by blaming the preparer for their content.157  In this 
regard, the court held Shanklin to a strict liability standard; he signed the 
filings and was therefore responsible for their content.158 
B.  SEC v. Espuelas 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
heard SEC v. Espuelas in 2010.159  In Espuelas, the defendants were officers 
and directors of StarMedia, an Internet portal targeting Spanish and 
Portuguese markets.160  The SEC’s allegations revolved around the revenue 
reported by StarMedia.161  The company was engaged in “barter 
transactions.”162  StarMedia sold advertising to generate revenue.163  Under 
a reciprocal agreement, StarMedia would then purchase an equal dollar 
amount of advertising, resulting in a net zero revenue effect.164  StarMedia 
failed to report these transactions as barter transactions, instead booking 
them as independent transactions.165  The result was overstated revenue.166  
The company also engaged in contingent transactions, which artificially 
boosted revenue.167  In these transactions, the company would present 
proposed advertising services to a client.168  If the client accepted the 
proposal, the company would receive a larger sum than if the proposal was 
rejected.169  The company would include the full revenue before the 
 
155  Id. at 736. 
156  Id. at 736 (quoting SEC v. McNulty, No. 94-CIV-7114(MBM), 1996 WL 422259, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1996)). 
157  Id. 
158  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 1644 (defining a wrong of strict liability as “a 
wrong in which a mens rea is not required because neither wrongful intent not culpable negligence is a 
necessary condition of responsibility”). 
159  See generally SEC v. Espuelas, 698 F. Supp. 2d 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
160  Id. at 418. 
161  Id. at 419. 
162  Id. 
163  Id. 
164  See id. 
165  Id. 
166  Id. 
167  Id. at 434. 
168  Id. at 421. 
169  Id. 
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proposal was accepted, fraudulently inflating revenue.170 
StarMedia’s officers and directors signed letters to their independent 
auditing firm Ernst & Young attesting that their “receivables represent valid 
claims . . . and do not include amounts for . . . other types of arrangements 
not constituting sales.”171  They also claimed to have included all sales 
agreements and asserted that no fraud was perpetrated by employees of the 
company, yet none of the reciprocal agreements or contingent agreements 
were communicated to the outside auditors.172 
The SEC brought charges against StarMedia officers for violating a 
multitude of Exchange Act rules, including SEC Rule 13b2-2 and other 
rules under section 13 of the Exchange Act.173  The officers moved to 
dismiss the charges against them, but the court denied the motions.174  The 
court stated there was no question materially misleading statements were 
made in letters to the independent auditor.175  Accordingly, the court relied 
on SEC v. McNulty, holding that Rule 13b2-2 does not require the SEC to 
plead and prove scienter.176 
IV.  ANALYSIS: SUPPORTING THE SECOND CIRCUIT VIEW 
Rule 13b2-2 is an important tool for the SEC to carry out their mission 
of protecting investors; maintaining fair, orderly and efficient markets; and 
facilitating capital formation.177  Aside from the legal reasons, there are 
valid policy reasons supporting the Second Circuit’s holding that the SEC 
need not prove scienter to prevail in civil actions to enforce Rule 13b2-2. 
A.  The Ninth Circuit’s Error 
When deciding SEC v. Todd, the Ninth Circuit used a criminal case 
holding to decide a civil case, failing to distinguish between the two.178  
This blurs the important fundamental distinctions between civil and 
criminal penalties and undermines the unique purposes of criminal and civil 
laws.  A guilty verdict in criminal cases can result in imprisonment, fines, 
 
170  Id. 
171  Id. at 423 (quoting Amended Complaint at 116, SEC v. Espuelas, 698 F. Supp. 2d 415 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010)) (discussing the misrepresentations made to Ernst & Young in the letters from the 
officers). 
172  Id. 
173  Id. at 434. 
174  Id. at 436. 
175  Id. 
176  Id. at 436 (citing SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732 (2d. Cir. 1998)). 
177  See Improper Influence, supra note 63. 
178  SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1219 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Goyal, 629 F.3d 
912 (9th Cir. 2010), a criminal case, in support of a knowingly standard to be used in Todd, a civil case). 
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probation, restitution, or death.179  Therefore, proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is required to convict on a criminal charge given the enhanced 
severity of possible penalties.180  Civil remedies, on the other hand, result in 
less onerous punishments, such as monetary awards or some form of 
injunctive relief.181  As such, the burden of proof is a preponderance of the 
evidence, a lower standard.182  Courts cannot apply the same burden of 
proof standards to civil and criminal cases.183 
To be punished criminally, one must act with some degree of scienter 
or mens rea.184  If scienter is a required element for civil liability, it may be 
necessary to specifically identify it as such.185  The Ninth Circuit analogized 
Goyal, a criminal case, to Todd, a civil case, to determine that scienter is 
required for liability under Rule 13b2-2.186  Scienter is not an express 
element of Rule 13b2-2.187  Because Todd was a civil case brought by the 
SEC for violation of a rule which does not require scienter, the Ninth 
Circuit erroneously relied on Goyal by holding that scienter was required 
for the respondents to be held civilly liable for their actions. 
The Ninth Circuit instead should have looked to cases such as 
McNulty, which were analogous but not binding, to hold that a civil action 
brought by the SEC under a rule that does not require scienter should not be 
held to a higher requirement—requiring scienter. 
B.  Legislative Intent: Sarbanes-Oxley 
In 2002, Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley to prevent a repeat of the 
accounting frauds that led to large corporate bankruptcies, market declines, 
and investor losses.188  The Act required the SEC to create or amend rules to 
 
179  Joseph L. Lester, Presumed Innocent, Feared Dangerous: The Eighth Amendment’s Right to 
Bail, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 32 (2005). 
180  Elizabeth A. Ryan, The 13th Juror: Re-Evaluating the Need for a Factual Sufficiency Review 
in Criminal Cases, 37 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1291, 1299 (2005). 
181  Sharon Finegan, The False Claims Act and Corporate Criminal Liability: Qui Tam Actions, 
Corporate Integrity Agreements and the Overlap of Criminal and Civil Law, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 625, 
626 (2007). 
182  Ryan, supra note 180, at 1299; see also Margaret H. Lemos, The Commerce Power and 
Criminal Punishment: Presumption of Constitutionality or Presumption of Innocence?, 84 TEX. L. REV. 
1203, 1205 (explaining that criminal prosecution is worse than civil sanction and therefore triggers 
distinct rights and duties). 
183  Ryan, supra note 180, at 1299. 
184  Siegel, supra note 81, at 1569. 
185  See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957). 
186  SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1219, 1219 (9th Cir. 2011). 
187  17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2 (2015). 
188  Johnson & Sides, supra note 59, at 1153; see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-204, §§ 301-08, 116 Stat. 745, 775-85 (2002). 
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regulate corporate responsibility for accurate financial reporting.189  Most 
relevant to this analysis are sections 302 and 303 of Title III, titled 
“Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports.”190 
Section 302 was an expression of Congress’s intention to hold 
corporate officers responsible for the accuracy of the information they 
disseminate.191  The section requires the SEC to create rules creating 
corporate officer accountability.192  Specifically, officers are held 
responsible for their organization’s internal controls,193 must disclose 
deficiencies and fraud to auditors,194 and disclose changes in internal 
controls.195  Furthermore, officers who sign quarterly and annual financial 
reports must review the reports196 to ensure the reports do not contain 
material misstatements or omissions,197 and fairly represent the company 
condition.198 
By enacting section 303, Congress verbalized its intention to protect 
the public interest and the interests of investors.199  Section 303 declares 
unlawful any action that will mislead auditors for the purpose of causing the 
auditors’ financial reports to be materially misleading.200  The SEC is 
granted exclusive jurisdiction to enforce, in civil proceedings, any rule or 
regulation issued under this section.201  There is no mention of “knowing” 
violations or “scienter” in the enabling statute.202  Accordingly, a scienter 
element should not be added to Rule 13b2-2 based on legislative intent 
because it was promulgated under section 303.  A court ruling that requires 
the SEC to prove scienter is tantamount to the court rewriting the enabling 
statute. 
C.  Subsequent SEC Rulemaking 
Based on section 303(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC proposed an 
amendment of then-existing Rule 13b2-2 to conform to the new law.203  In 
 
189  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101. 
190  Id. at § 302. 
191  Id. 
192  Id. at § 302(a). 
193  Id. at § 302(a)4. 
194  Id. at § 302(a)5. 
195  Id. at § 302(a)6. 
196  Id. at § 302(a)(1). 
197  Id. at § 302(a)2. 
198  Id. at § 302(a)3. 
199  Id. at § 303(a). 
200  Id. 
201  Id. at § 303(b). 
202  See generally id. at §§ 302-03. 
203  Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,325, 65,325 (Oct. 24, 2002) (to be 
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October of 2002 the proposed Rule was published in the Federal Register 
for notice and comment.204  Specifically, the Commission solicited 
comments on the wording of the Rule addressing certain actions “to coerce, 
manipulate, mislead or fraudulently influence” auditors.205  The SEC 
included this language to address these actions, creating civil liability for 
them regardless of the effect on audit results.206  The Commission explicitly 
stated in the Rule proposal that the word “fraudulently” modified the word 
“influence” exclusively, and did not apply to the coercion, manipulation, or 
misleading elements of the Rule.207 
The SEC received comments suggesting that “fraudulently” should 
modify all of the actions, not only the influence aspect of the Rule.208  
Others suggested a materiality aspect to the misleading element, or that 
“any attempt to purposely skew the issuer’s disclosure should violate the 
[R]ule.”209  Ernst & Young, one of the “Big Four” international accounting 
firms,210 suggested that fraudulent intent should not be required for officers 
or directors, but should be required for third parties.211  The SEC ultimately 
decided that the “fraudulently” modifier would apply only to the verb 
“influence.”212  To clarify the Rule, “fraudulently influence” was placed at 
the end of the sentence to ensure that only “influence” was subject to the 
“fraudulently” modifier.213 
Addressing the other comments, the Commission specified that Rule 
13b2-2 historically prohibited making, or causing to be made, materially 
misleading statements to auditors, and the new Rule would not modify the 
existing standard.214  The SEC reiterated that the purpose of Sarbanes-Oxley 
is to restore investor confidence in financial reporting, and decided that 
 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
204  Id. 
205  Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, 68 Fed. Reg. 31,820, 31,820 (May 28, 2003) (to 
be codified at C.F.R. pt. 240) (emphasis added). 
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208  Id. 
209  Id. 
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INDUSTRY 332 (12th ed.) (citing S.A. ZEFF, HOW THE US ACCOUNTING PROFESSION GOT WHERE IT IS 
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2014). 
211  Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, supra note 205, at 31,820. 
212  Id. at 31,823. 
213  Id. 
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“imposing what would amount to a new scienter requirement on the 
preexisting provision prohibiting officers and directors from causing 
misleading statements or omissions to be made to auditors” would be 
contrary to the intent of the Act.215 
D.  Deference to SEC Interpretation 
There are two deference standards that courts may apply to determine 
whether to defer to an agency interpretation: Skidmore deference and 
Chevron deference.216  Chevron deference is more frequently cited by the 
Supreme Court, and is a very deferential standard.217  Chevron is often used 
when agencies use formal rulemaking, or rulemaking utilizing notice and 
comment rulemaking—as the SEC did with the promulgation of 13b2-2.218  
Skidmore is used less often, and is less deferential.219  Skidmore is more 
frequently used for interpretive rules, which do not utilize notice and 
comment periods.220  Under both doctrines, courts generally will defer to an 
administrative agency’s interpretation of the authority granted to it.221  In 
the interest of thorough analysis, a brief Skidmore discussion will be 
followed by a deeper Chevron analysis. 
1.  Skidmore Deference 
Skidmore v. Swift was a Supreme Court case to determine whether to 
defer to an interpretive bulletin issued by the Administrator of Labor.222  
The employees verbally agreed to sleep on premises, and receive overtime 
pay only when answering alarms.223  The employees then sued their 
employer for overtime pay for all their time spent on call, including when 
they were sleeping on premises.224  Lower courts dismissed the workers’ 
suit.225  The Administrator of Labor bulletin suggested a flexible solution to 
consider the freedom of the employee to engage in personal activities, 
rather than an “all-in” or “all-out” approach to “on call” pay.226  Deferring 
to the agency, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, allowing the 
 
215  Id. 
216  Bradley Lipton, Accountability, Deference, and the Skidmore Doctrine, 119 YALE L.J. 2096, 
2123 (2010). 
217  Id. 
218  Id. at 2123. 
219  Id. at 2098. 
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222  Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
223  Id. at 135. 
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226  Id. at 138. 
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case to be heard to determine if the employers should determine if, and how 
much, employees should be compensated for this time where they may not 
be working, but are still limited in where they can go or what they can 
do.227  The Court acknowledged that the agency interpretations are not 
binding on the Court, but that interpretations do “constitute a body of 
experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may 
properly resort for guidance.”228 
It logically follows, therefore, that a court would likely defer to the 
SEC interpretation of the laws and rules based on its vast experience in 
securities law.  Skidmore deference, applied to SEC’s interpretation of Rule 
13b2-2, would likely relieve the SEC from the need to prove scienter to 
prevail in a civil enforcement case. 
2.  Chevron Deference 
Courts would more likely apply the Chevron doctrine when analyzing 
deference standards, because Rule 13b2-2 was subject to notice and 
comment, and was not merely an interpretive rule.229  So long as the 
enabling statute was ambiguous, and the agency interpretation is 
reasonable, Chevron deference will apply.230  Chevron v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council is a Supreme Court case establishing a two-part test.231  
The first part of the test is to determine if Congress’ intent was clear, or if 
the statute is ambiguous.232  If the statute is found to be ambiguous, the 
court will move to the second part of the analysis, deciding if the agency 
interpretation was permissible based on the statute as written.233 
The Chevron case involved the Clean Air Act passed by Congress, 
which required polluters to obtain a permit before constructing any new or 
modified “stationary sources” of pollution.234  In interpreting the statute, the 
EPA promulgated a rule creating a “bubble policy” regarding the stationary 
sources,235 grouping together pollution emitting devices within a facility.236  
As a result, modifications to equipment occurring within a “bubble” would 
not require the permit under the EPA regulation.237 
 
227  Id. at 139-40. 
228  Id. at 140. 
229  Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of 
Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 1108 (2001). 
230  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
231  Id. at 842-43. 
232  Id. 
233  Id. at 843. 
234  Id. at 848-49. 
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338 FIU Law Review [Vol. 10:317 
 
The Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) is one of several 
environmental-action groups who sought judicial review of the EPA 
regulation of permit requirements for modifications, or new construction, 
within an existing “bubble.”238  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia set aside the regulation, holding that the EPA “bubble 
policy” did not appropriately define a polluting facility.239 
The Supreme Court overturned the appellate court decision.240  First, 
the Court analyzed the enabling statute, the Clean Air Act, finding that the 
Act “does not explicitly define what Congress envisioned as a ‘stationary 
source’ to which the permit program . . . should apply.”241  Nor could intent 
be ascertained in the legislative history.242  Finding the meaning of a 
stationary source to be ambiguous in the statute, the Court moved to the 
second part of the test, holding that the agency interpretation “represented a 
reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests and was 
entitled to deference.”243  Chevron is the primary basis for judicial 
deference to agency interpretations when statutes are ambiguous, and the 
agency interpretation is reasonable.244 
E.  Rule 13b2-2 Deference Analysis Under Chevron: The Ambiguity 
Element 
The first part of the analysis under Chevron is to determine if the 
enabling statute is ambiguous as to a scienter requirement.245  The enabling 
statute, Sarbanes-Oxley § 303, is divided into four parts.  Part (a) is the 
substantive law that will be analyzed for ambiguity.246  Parts (b), (c), and 
(d) discuss enforcement authority, preemption of other laws, and deadlines 
for SEC rulemaking respectively.247 
Section 303(a) charges the SEC with creating rules as it deems 
“necessary and appropriate” to protect the public and investors from 
 
238  Id. at 837. 
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240  Id. at 866. 
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244  See generally Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 
(2005) (holding the enabling statute was ambiguous in defining “telecommunications service,” and the 
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Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the plain language 
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unreasonable given the purpose of the statute, granting Chevron Deference to the IRS). 
245   Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
246  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 303(a), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 778 (2002). 
247  Id. at § 303(b)-(d). 
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misinformation provided to auditors by directors and officers of 
companies.248  Specifically, the statute forbids officers or directors, or 
anyone acting at their behest, from taking “any action to fraudulently 
influence, coerce, manipulate, or mislead” accounting professionals or 
auditors “for the purpose of rendering such financial statements materially 
misleading.”249 
Ambiguity arises in the statute when determining whether 
misinformation must be given intentionally, or whether negligence is 
enough for a violation to occur.  Notably, the statute “contains no words 
indicating that Congress intended to impose a ‘scienter’ requirement,” such 
as knowingly or willfully.250  Criminal liability for rule violation expressly 
carries a “knowingly” requirement.251  However, the SEC may only bring 
civil enforcement cases against defendants.252  Because the statute expressly 
mentions criminal enforcement, but is silent on civil enforcement, 
ambiguity exists as to a scienter requirement for civil enforcement.  This 
ambiguity leads to part two of the Chevron test, to determine if the SEC 
interpretation is reasonable.253 
F.  Rule 13b2-2 Deference Analysis Under Chevron: The Reasonableness 
Element 
Interpretations made by the SEC regarding the Rule are reasonable, 
and therefore entitled to deference as long as they are not (1) arbitrary and 
capricious, or (2) contrary to the language of the statute.254 
 
248  Id.  The language of the statute is as follows: 
(a) Rules to prohibit 
It shall be unlawful, in contravention of such rules or regulations as the Commission shall 
prescribe as necessary and appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, for 
any officer or director of an issuer, or any other person acting under the direction thereof, to take 
any action to fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate, or mislead any independent public or 
certified accountant engaged in the performance of an audit of the financial statements of that 
issuer for the purpose of rendering such financial statements materially misleading. 
249  Id. 
250  McConville v. SEC, 465 F.3d 780, 789 (2006) (citing Promotion of the Reliability of 
Financial Information and Prevention of the Concealment of Questionable or Illegal Corporate Payments 
and Practices, Exchange Act Release No. 34,15570, 16 SEC Docket 1143, 1151 (February 15,1979)); 
see also 17 C.F.R. 240.13b2-2 (stating that no director or officer of an issuer, in connection with an 
audit or examination of the issuer’s financial statements or the preparation of any document or report to 
be filed with the Commission, directly or indirectly shall (a) make or cause to be made a materially false 
or misleading statement to an accountant or (b) omit to state, or cause another person to omit to state, 
any material fact necessary to make statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such 
statements were made, not misleading to an accountant). 
251  15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(4)-(5). 
252  Securities Fraud, supra note 47, at 1275. 
253  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
254  McConville, 465 F.3d at 786; see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
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1.  Arbitrary and Capricious (Rational Basis) 
The arbitrary and capricious test, established by the Supreme Court in 
the early 1940’s and also known as the “rational basis” test, was codified in 
1946 in the APA, providing a basis for judicial review of agency actions.255  
The test consists of two factors.256  First, the rule will be analyzed to 
determine if it furthers a legitimate statutory governmental purpose, as 
opposed to a general governmental purpose.257  Second, the court must 
decide if the rule is rationally related to that purpose.258 
i.  Legitimate Statutory Government Purpose 
Rule 13b2-2 satisfies the first part of the arbitrary and capricious test 
because it furthers a legitimate statutory governmental purpose.  The 
Congressional intent was to protect investors from directors and officers 
who provide information to auditors that may produce misleading results.259  
The resulting Rule created by the SEC clarifies and expands on the original 
Rule 13B-2 by specifically prohibiting officers and directors from 
“improperly influencing” auditors.260  The new Rule also applies these rules 
to audits of investment company financial statements.261 
Congress intended for courts, when applying the arbitrary and 
capricious standard, to consider the agency purpose and means for 
regulating behavior on a rational basis standard of review.262 
ii. Rational Relation to the Legitimate Purpose 
The SEC interpretation of the enabling statute need not be the only 
possible interpretation of the statute, or the interpretation that the court 
would have chosen.263  The SEC rule simply must be a permissible 
interpretation of the statutory language.264  Agency rules should not be 
disturbed when the rule addresses conflicting policy concerns between the 
agency, other organizations or the public, and is within the bounds of the 
 
255  Scott A. Keller, Depoliticizing Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 84 WASH. L. REV. 
419, 430 (2009). 
256  Id. 
257  Id. 
258  Id. 
259  Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, 68 Fed. Reg. 31,820, 31,820 (May 28, 2003) (to 
be codified at C.F.R. pt. 240), available at https://federalregister.gov/a/03-13095. 
260  Id. 
261  Id. 
262  Keller, supra note 255, at 431. 
263  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
264  Id. at 842-43. 
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enabling statute.265 
Conflicting policy concerns were indeed considered when Rule 13b2-2 
was adopted in 2003.266  The SEC noted that during the notice and comment 
period, comments from banking institutions and auditing firms expressed a 
concern that a negligence standard would cause a “chilling effect” on 
communications between officers and directors, and between auditors.267  
The SEC claimed these concerns were based on an incorrect assumption; 
that the SEC has not historically enforced the negligent communication of 
misleading information in the past.268  Instead, for many years the SEC has 
brought enforcement actions of that very type based on the “known or 
should have known” standard.269 
A court deciding if a rule is rationally related to the legitimate purpose 
of the statute must engage in a subjective analysis, but the facts make it 
hard to argue that it is not.  The final rule press release discusses the 
comments received during the notice and comment period, explaining 
misconceptions and clarifying the purpose of the rule.270  It explains the 
historical and continued use of the negligence standard, and how that relates 
to the language of the enabling statute.271  It also affirmed that the 
commission had no intention to hold parties accountable for “honest and 
reasonable” accounting errors, as opposed to negligent or intended fraud.272  
The commission also reinforces the underlying policy purpose of restoring 
investor confidence in the audit process.273 
2.  Contrary to the Language of the Statute 
While some may argue that there is no ambiguity in the underlying 
statute, questioning the validity of the Rule, to argue that the Rule is 
contrary to the statute would be a further stretch.  The statute tasks the SEC 
to create a rule to protect investors by declaring unlawful any actions that 
can lead to materially misleading financial statements.274  The Rule that the 
SEC adopted serves that purpose, and in no way conflicts with the letter or 
 
265  Id. at 845 (citing United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1961)). 
266  See Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, 68 Fed. Reg. 31,820, 31,820 (May 28, 2003) 
(to be codified at C.F.R. pt. 240), available at https://federalregister.gov/a/03-13095. 
267  Id. at nn.33-35. 
268  Id. 
269  Id. at n.4. 
270  See generally Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, Exchange Act Release No. 26,050, 
80 SEC Docket 770 (May 20, 2003) (discussing comments received during the notice and comment 
period). 
271  Id. at *4. 
272  Id. 
273  Id. 
274  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 303, 116 Stat. 745, 778 (2002). 
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spirit of the enabling statute.275 
To summarize the deference analysis of Rule 13b2-2, Chevron 
analysis is preferred over Skidmore analysis because the Rule was created 
with a notice and comment period, and is not simply an interpretive rule.  
Applying Chevron, the enabling statute is ambiguous as to a scienter 
requirement, meaning courts will defer to the SEC so long as their rule is 
reasonable.  The Rule is reasonable because it is not arbitrary or capricious, 
it is rationally related to a legitimate purpose, and it is not contrary to the 
underlying statute.  Therefore, courts should defer to the SEC interpretation 
of Sarbanes-Oxley section 303, and permit enforcement of Rule 13b2-2 as 
written, using a negligence standard. 
G.  Supreme Court Decisions 
Before Hochfelder,276 courts generally held that violations of the 
Securities Acts were held to a negligence standard.277  From the inception of 
the SEC in the 1940s, courts used a broad reading of the rules, and 
evaluated the end result of an action to determine liability.278  Courts 
decided the cases based on the facts and the SEC rule, but did not make a 
thorough scienter analysis.279  Through the 1960s, courts continued to look 
at the legislative intent behind the statutes and SEC rules, leaning more 
towards a negligence standard than a scienter standard.280  To date, 
decisions of the circuit courts and Supreme Court have been split regarding 
the reasoning for, and requirement of, scienter to be proven in SEC 
enforcement actions.281 
1.  The Capital Gains Decision: No Scienter Required 
In 1963, an SEC enforcement case came before the Supreme Court to 
 
275  See Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, 68 Fed. Reg. at 31,820. 
276  Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
277  Charles S. Telly, Proxies and the Modern Corporation: Scienter Under Sections 14a and 10b 
of the Securities Exchange Act, 19 TULSA L. REV. 491, 556 (1984). 
278  See generally In re Ward LaFrance Truck Corp 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943) (holding that mere 
failure to disclose material facts to the shareholders created liability); see also Fischman v. Raytheon 
Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d. Cir 1951) (holding that a broad generalized finding of fraud is actionable 
under securities laws). 
279  See id. 
280  See Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961) (holding that the defendants’ assertion 
that genuine fraud must be alleged and proven is not sufficient.  The court stated that “any manipulative 
device or contrivance” in contravention of the rules was to be read broadly, again affirming that scienter 
was not an element required for liability.”). 
281  See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (“We hold that the scienter requirement enunciated 
in Hochfelder is not applicable to government enforcement actions brought under §§ 10(b) and 21(d) of 
the 1934 Act.  Consistent with the pre-Hochfelder decisions of this Court, we continue to hold that 
allegations and proof of negligence alone will suffice, for the reasons stated below.”). 
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address the elements required to enforce securities rules.282  SEC v. Capital 
Gains Research Bureau, Inc. involved a company that issued research 
reports via subscription.283  The company purchased shares of securities on 
six separate occasions before recommending them in a research report.284  
After recommending the securities, the price and volume rose, and the 
company liquidated its shares to capture a gain.285  None of the trades were 
disclosed to the subscribers of the analyst reports.286 
The SEC requested a preliminary injunction to enforce the Investment 
Advisors Act of 1940.287  The district court denied the injunction, holding 
that the words “fraud” and “deceit” required a knowledge and intent on the 
part of Capital Gains to injure their clients.288  The Second Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s decision five-to-four.289  The dissenting judges opined 
that the business climate had matured from the inceptions of common law 
fraud290 and deceit, and a broader interpretation must be adopted to suit the 
securities industry.291 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the securities 
laws required intent to cause injury, or whether a broad interpretation of the 
rules should be used.292  The Court discussed the financial landscape 
leading to the 1940 Act, and the need for regulation.293  The Court noted 
that the Act regulated actions taken by an advisor consciously or 
subconsciously that may affect the advisor’s financial interests.294  The 
Court held that Congress “intended the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 to 
be construed like other securities legislation ‘enacted for the purpose of 
avoiding frauds.’”295  The Court assumed that Congress was not ignorant to 
the changes in financial landscape since the doctrine of common law fraud 
was established, and held that securities legislation must be read broadly to 
 
282  SEC v. Capital Gains Res. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). 
283  Id. at 182-83. 
284  Id. at 183. 
285  Id. 
286  See id. 
287  Id. 
288  Id. at 184. 
289  Id. 
290  See William H. Kuehnle, On Scienter, Knowledge, and Recklessness Under the Federal 
Securities Laws, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 121, 166 (1997) (Under the common law of fraud, to recover 
damages requires intent to defraud.  The SEC seeks injunctive relief and is not a private plaintiff 
recovering damages.  Since the SEC actions are civil enforcement, the common law of fraud should not 
apply.). 
291  SEC v. Capital Gains Res. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 185 (1963). 
292  Id. 
293  Id. at 188. 
294  Id. 
295  Id. at 195 (emphasis added). 
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encompass the legislative intent of the statutes.296  Accordingly, the Court 
reversed the lower court decision, and remanded in favor of the SEC 
injunction.297 
2.  The Hochfelder Decision: Scienter Required 
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder was a private action brought by investors 
under the Securities Act of 1934 against the auditor of a brokerage firm that 
was responsible for auditing and filing the annual reports of the securities 
firm.298  The plaintiffs alleged that Ernst and Ernst (“Ernst”) aided and 
abetted the firm by failing to detect fraudulent actions, in violation of 
section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5.299  
The district court rejected Ernst’s contention that fraud charges could not be 
brought on negligence grounds, but dismissed the case due to inadequate 
facts to support the action.300  The Circuit Court reversed, holding that Ernst 
had a duty to inquire and disclose, and by breaching that duty, was liable to 
the investors.301 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if a private action 
can succeed absent a finding of “intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
defraud.”302  The Court looked at the legislative intent of the enabling 
statute contained in the 1934 Act and subsequent SEC rulemaking.303  The 
Court also looked at the language of the statute, and was unconvinced by 
the suggestion of the SEC that Congressional intent and prior case law lean 
towards a flexible interpretation, instead holding that the language clearly 
supported the necessity to prove scienter.304  The SEC also failed to 
convince the Court that Congress would explicitly require scienter when it 
intended to include it as an element, using section 9(e) as an example: “any 
person who willfully participates in any act or transaction . . . .”305 
The Court explored legislative intent independently, holding Congress 
failed to explicitly answer whether scienter would be required.306  “Neither 
the intended scope of [s]ection 10(b) nor the reasons for the changes in its 
operative language are revealed explicitly in the legislative history of the 
 
296  Id. 
297  Id. at 201. 
298  Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 188 (1976). 
299  Id. at 190. 
300  Id. at 191. 
301  Id. at 192. 
302  See id. at 193. 
303  Id. at 196. 
304  Id. at 201. 
305  Id. at 207 (emphasis added). 
306  Id. at 201. 
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1934 Act . . . .”307  The Court also quoted from a Senate Report entitled 
Manipulative Practices, which contains the phrase “[t]he defendant may 
escape liability by showing that the statement was made in good faith.”308  
The Court ultimately ruled that the language of the Rule required scienter to 
be proven for liability, and declined to extend liability to negligent 
conduct.309 
The dissent in Hochfelder read the language of the SEC rule to apply 
to negligent and intentional conduct alike.310  Aside from the language of 
the statute, the dissent also opined that the statutes were enacted for the 
“broad, needed, and deserving benefit” of the victim investors.311 
After the Hochfelder decision, district and circuit courts either cited to 
Hochfelder, dismissing for lack of scienter,312 or distinguished cases to find 
liability absent scienter.313  Courts generally held that the Hochfelder 
holding, based on a private action, was not applicable to SEC enforcement 
actions, and holdings prior to Hochfelder continued to be binding.314  The 
Aaron v. SEC decision would resolve that issue in 1980. 
3.  The Aaron Decision: Scienter Required 
Aaron v. SEC applied the decision in Hochfelder to the SEC as well as 
private plaintiffs, and analyzed sections 17(a)(1), (2), and (3) to determine if 
scienter is a required element to be proven.315  It is this reasoning and 
analysis that are important to the present analysis of Rule 13b2-2.  Aaron 
was a manager at a New York broker-dealer.316  He supervised two brokers 
who repeatedly disseminated false information about a company, despite 
warnings from the company itself and lawyers involved with the 
 
307  See id. at 202. 
308  Id. at 206 (citing S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 13 (1934)). 
309  See id. at 214. 
310  Id. at 217. 
311  Id. at 218. 
312  See, e.g., SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1244 (S.D.N.Y 1976) (holding that the 
Commission had not proven that the defendant acted with the requisite scienter, and therefore defendant 
was not in violation of Rule 10b-5 or section 10(b) of the Exchange Act). 
313  See generally SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 540 (1st Cir. 1976) (holding 
that a suit for potential future actions does not require a showing of state of mind); SEC v. Geotek, 426 
F. Supp. 715, 726 (N.D. Cal. 1976) aff’d sub nom. SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 
1979)  (holding that the Supreme Court holding in Hochfelder requiring scienter on a suit under section 
10(b) does not extend to suits under other sections of the Exchange Act); SEC v. Universal Major Indus. 
Corp., 546 F.2d 1044, 1046 (1976) (holding that the Supreme Court did not intend “that those who play 
an indispensible role in the sale” of unregistered securities to be immune from SEC initiated, injunctive 
relief). 
314  See Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d at 1047 (1976). 
315  See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691, 695-96 (1980). 
316  Id. at 682. 
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company.317  Aaron was aware, but failed to prevent the brokers from 
misleading their clients.318  The SEC sought an injunction in district court 
under Rule 10b-5 and sections 17(a)(1), (2), and (3).319 
The district court granted the injunction, noting that “negligence alone 
might suffice to establish a violation,” but holding that the intentional 
failure to stop the dissemination of misleading statements was also 
sufficient to establish scienter.320  The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that 
“proof of negligence alone will suffice” for a SEC enforcement action.321  
The Court pointed out that the Hochfelder court did not decide whether 
scienter is required for SEC enforcement actions.322  The appellate court 
cited SEC v. Coven323 and its analysis of the scienter requirement under 
section 17(a), holding that the language of the statute did not require intent, 
and that Congress considered a scienter requirement, but ultimately “opted 
for liability without willfulness, intent to defraud, or the like.”324 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide if scienter was a 
required element of these SEC rules.325  This analysis can be applied to 
Rule 13b2-2 as well.  Without much analysis, the Court quoted the 
Hochfelder decision, extending that holding to SEC enforcement cases as 
well.326  The Court failed to distinguish a private cause of action from an 
enforcement action, and failed to consider the common law fraud doctrine 
analysis made by the Capital Gains Court.327  While acknowledging 
Congressional intent to enact legislation protecting investors against fraud 
with rules “to be construed ‘not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to 
effectuate its remedial purposes,’”328 the Court instead insisted that the 
language of the statute did not permit an interpretation in line with the 
intent of Congress.329 
The Court then picked apart sections 17(a)(1), (2), and (3), holding 
that 17(a)(1) required a showing of scienter, but 17(a)(2), and (a)(3) did not 
 
317  Id. at 683. 
318  Id. 
319  See id. at 684. 
320  Id. 
321  Id. at 685. 
322  Id. 
323  SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978). 
324  Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 686 (1980) (citing Coven, 581 F.2d at 1027-28). 
325  Id. at 686. 
326  Id. at 691. 
327  See id. at 695. 
328  Id. at 695 (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. U.S., 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)) (quoting 
SEC v. Capital Gains Res. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963)). 
329  Aaron, 446 U.S. at 695. 
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require scienter.330  In so holding, the Court pointed to the language of 
17(a)(1), specifically the words “device,” “scheme,” and “artifice,” which 
the Court stated “all connote knowing or intentional practices.”331  Section 
17(a)(1) also shares the word “device” with Rule 10b-5, and borrowing 
from the Hochfelder analysis, the Court maintained that “device” embraces 
a scienter requirement.332 
Analyzing 17(a)(2), the Court held that the language of the Rule did 
not require scienter, instead looking at the end result, and not the intent 
behind, the regulated conduct.333  The Court said the language of the Rule 
prohibits “any type of material misstatement or omission . . . that has the 
effect of defrauding investors, whether the wrongdoing was intentional or 
not.”334  Similarly, the Court looked at the language contained in Rule 
17(a)(3), specifically language proscribing engagement “in any transaction, 
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud 
or deceit.”335  The Court, analogizing 17(a)(3) to the analysis of section 
206(2) of the 1940 Act in Capital Gains, held that under 17(a)(3), 
deliberate action is not required to protect investors.336 
The dissenting opinion in Aaron calls for distinguishing between a 
private action and a SEC enforcement action.337  Justice Blackmun stated 
that the language was not as clear as the majority suggested.338  A historical 
argument of legal tradition also distinguished between common law fraud at 
law requiring scienter, and a suit in the court of chancery at equity, that did 
not require intent.339  Finally, Blackmun briefly reviewed legislative intent, 
discussing various state securities laws that led to, and provided a model for 
federal law.340  These laws empowered state attorneys general to bring suit 
for injunctive relief whenever fraudulent conduct was uncovered, 
intentional or not.341 
4.  Synergy: Analysis of 13b2-2 Based on the Supreme Court Holdings 
Applying the holdings in Capital Gains, Hochfelder, and Aaron, 
 
330  Id. at 695-96. 
331  Id. at 696. 
332  Id. 
333  Id. 
334  Id. at 696 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212 (1976)). 
335  Id. at 697 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3)) (emphasis in original). 
336  See id. (comparing section 17(a)(3) to the analysis of § 206(2) of the Investment Advisors 
Act of 1940 in SEC v. Capital Gains Res. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 200 (1963)). 
337  Id. at 704 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
338  Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
339  Id. at 709-11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
340  See id. at 711 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
341  Id. at 712 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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scienter should not be an element of SEC enforcement actions under Rule 
13b2-2.  The Supreme Court has analyzed three major factors when 
evaluating the securities rules (1) the statutory language, (2) the legislative 
intent, and (3) historical context.342 
i.  Statutory Language 
The Supreme Court has held that words like “device,”343 “scheme,”344 
and “artifice”345 are all words that indicate the need to prove scienter.  
Neither Sarbanes-Oxley section 303(a) nor Rule 13b2-2 contains those 
terms.346  Further, the language of Rule 13b2-2 looks to the end result; that 
is to prevent materially false or misleading information from being 
communicated to auditors.347  Neither willfulness nor intent is indicated as a 
factor in determining whether the Rule has been violated.348  Like sections 
17(a)(2) and (3), Rule 13b2-2 does not require deliberate conduct to carry 
out the purpose of the Rule to protect investors.349 
ii.  Legislative Intent 
The Capital Gains Court assumed that Congress, in enacting the 
statute, was aware of the changing landscape of the securities industry, 
holding that the securities laws must be interpreted broadly to carry out the 
intent of Congress, to protect investors.350  The Hochfelder Court 
discounted the SEC assertions that Congress included the words “willfully” 
or “intentionally” when required, and referred to a report that indicated that 
misstatements or omissions made in good faith were not actionable.351  The 
Aaron Court borrowed from Hochfelder in its analysis of section 17(a)(1) 
looking for legislative intent in the language of the statute.352  Absent the 
shared language of Rule 10b-5, the Court looked to the end result that 
Congress wanted to prevent when analyzing sections 17(a)(2) and (3).353 
 
342  See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 
(1980); SEC v. Capital Gains Res. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). 
343  See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 214. 
344  See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 681. 
345  See id. 
346  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2; see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 
303(a), 116 Stat. 745, 778 (2002). 
347  17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2. 
348  See generally id. 
349  See id. 
350  See SEC v. Capital Gains Res. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963). 
351  See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 205-06 (1976). 
352  See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 681. 
353  See id. 
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Sarbanes Oxley section 303 was enacted in 2002.354  Based on the 
Court’s jurisprudence in this area of the law it is fair to assume that, if 
Congress was not aware of the modern financial landscape and how it 
differs from the days when the doctrine of common law fraud was 
developed, it is now.  Congress is now on constructive notice of the need to 
be explicit in the realm of securities law, having seen the cases that have 
come before the various circuit courts and the Supreme Court.355  And yet, 
Congress has opted not to use the words “willful” or “intentional” in the 
statute.356  The language of the statute does indeed seek to regulate an end 
result, and as such should be interpreted broadly to carry out its function. 
5.  Compare and Contrast with other SEC Rules 
Omission of an explicit scienter requirement is not conclusive proof 
that the SEC is not required to prove scienter when enforcing a rule.357  For 
instance, Rule 13b2-2 does not contain an explicit scienter requirement.358  
But the SEC has enacted other rules that do not explicitly require scienter, 
yet the Supreme Court has found scienter to be a required element for 
finding a violation of the Rule.359  These rules can be distinguished from 
13b2-2 by analyzing the statute and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. 
Arguably the most commonly enforced SEC rule, Rule 10b-5 forbids 
material misstatements or omissions in connection with the purchase or sale 
of securities.360  While the language of the statute does not explicitly require 
scienter for civil liability, the Supreme Court has held that scienter is 
required to prevail on a civil 10b-5 charge.361  Specifically, the Court held 
 
354  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 303, 116 Stat. 745, 778 (2002). 
355  Id. 
356  Id. 
357  See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1) (2011).  The Supreme 
Court has ruled that these rules, while not explicitly stating a scienter requirement, do require the SEC to 
prove the element of scienter. 
358  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2. 
359  See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701 (1980) (holding the SEC must prove the element of 
scienter for a finding of liability for violating Rule 10b-5). 
360  Allyson Poulos et al., Securities Fraud, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1479, 1482 (2013); see also 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities 
exchange, 
(a) To employ and device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a 
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
361  See generally Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) 
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that use of the words “manipulative and deceptive” to modify “device or 
contrivance” in section 10(b) strongly suggests an element of scienter.362  
Such an outcome is unsurprising, and is consistent with one of the major 
components of the Aaron decision.363  Recall, in Aaron v. SEC, the Supreme 
Court affirmed that the requirement to establish scienter to prevail on a 10b-
5 action applies when the SEC is the plaintiff as well.364  The holding also 
affirmed the analysis of the language of section 10(b), pointing out that 
“‘manipulative,’ ‘deceptive,’ and ‘contrivance’ clearly refer to knowing and 
intentional misconduct.”365  The Court added that the legislative history 
indicated an intention to include a scienter requirement.366 
To establish liability for a violation under section 17(a)(1) of the 
Securities Act of 1933, a plaintiff must establish scienter.367  Like any other 
plaintiff, the scienter requirement applies to the SEC as well.368  In Aaron, 
the Supreme Court analyzed the statutory language “to employ any device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud,” and held that the legislature clearly intended 
for scienter to be an element of the offense.369  Comparing the language of 
17(a)(1) to the Hochfelder ruling regarding Rule 10b-5, the Court held that 
inclusion of the word “device” was indicative of a scienter requirement in 
17(a)(1), just as the Hochfelder Court held it was for Rule 10b-5.370 
The Supreme Court has contrasted the language in section 17(a)(1) and 
Rule 10b-5 that require scienter, to the language of section 17(a)(2) and (3) 
of the Securities Act of 1933 that do not.371  The language of 17(a)(2), “to 
obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material 
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, 
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It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities 
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not misleading,” does not indicate that intent to defraud is required.372  The 
making of an untrue statement does not indicate intent; merely making the 
statement, with or without intent, violates the Rule.373  Contrast the making 
of a statement with employing a device, scheme or artifice to defraud; 
employing indicates not only mere action, but also intention to defraud.374  
Taking calculated steps to defraud, versus making misleading statements 
that can be made knowingly or unknowingly, is the difference between the 
requirement to prove scienter or not. 
Analysis of section 17(a)(3) yields similar results.375  The Aaron Court 
looked at the end result, not the action leading to that result, to determine if 
scienter is an element to be proven for a violation.376  Here the statute 
prohibits engagement “in any transaction, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.”377  
The Court held that deliberate dishonesty is not required, analogizing the 
language of the statute with similar language in section 206(2) of the 
Investment Advisors Act of 1940 that also did not require “deliberate 
dishonesty as a condition precedent to protecting investors.”378 
Rule 13b2-2 is worded such that the Supreme Court would likely hold 
that scienter is not a required element that the SEC must prove for a court to 
find a defendant civilly liable.379  The language of 13b2-2 does not involve 
engaging in deceitful or scheming activity for a violation to occur.380  One 
need not employ a “device” to violate 13b2-2.381  Instead, like sections 
17(a)(2) and (3), 13b2-2 seems to focus on the end result; that is to prevent 
the communication of misleading information or the omission of such 
information to auditors, subsequently misleading investors.382 
The wording of Rule 13b2-2, such as (a)(1) and (c)(1)(i) (to “make or 
cause to be made a materially false or misleading statement to an 
accountant,”)383 and (a)(2) and (c)(1)(ii) (“[o]mit to state, or cause another 
person to omit to state . . .”) are more analogous to the wording of 17(a)(2), 
which reads “to obtain money or property by means of any untrue 
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382  See id.; see also Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, 68 Fed. Reg. 31,820, 31,820 
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statement . . . ,”384 and 17(a)(3), which reads “to engage in any transaction, 
practice or course of business which would operate as a fraud . . . .”385  
These rules are common in that they do not employ a scheme or artifice to 
defraud, nor do they use a device to defraud. 
6.  A Scienter Requirement is a High Hurdle to Overcome 
Requiring the SEC to prove scienter in a Rule 13b2-2 civil 
enforcement action is akin to providing a negligence defense to defendants.  
Directors and officers have a fiduciary duty to provide accurate financial 
information to accountants and auditors.386  By requiring the SEC to prove 
scienter when misleading information is given, defendants who, as a result 
of actual negligent behavior or as a result of intentional behavior disguised 
as simple negligence, become immune to SEC enforcement actions to 
remedy past or prevent future fraud. 
The SEC is up against a powerful force—greed.  Greed is a naturally 
motivating human instinct.387  A driver for positive creativity, efficiency, 
and success, greed can also be dangerous if left unchecked, transforming 
from a positive motivator to a negative motivator to seek gains without 
regard to the consequences of others.388  This negative motivator, combined 
with a scienter requirement, makes it worthwhile for one to misrepresent 
information for their personal or corporate gain, knowing full well that the 
ability of the SEC, as well as the private class action litigator, is limited and 
unlikely to succeed. 
The Private Litigation Securities Reform Act of 1995 (“PLSRA”) was 
designed to prevent abuses by class action private plaintiffs by requiring, 
among other things, increased specificity of the misleading information 
alleged, “pleading with particularity the facts giving rise to a strong 
inference of scienter,” and a halt to discovery until the first two elements 
are met.389  These requirements act as a hurdle to be jumped before their 
action can move forward.390  Congress cited two primary purposes for 
enacting the PSLRA; to reduce abusive litigation, and to reduce coercive 
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settlements.391  These purposes do not translate to the SEC, having no stake 
in the outcome except that of fulfilling their mission, which is to protect 
investors.  In sum, a negligence standard would hold directors and officers 
to the professional standard required of their position, and allow the SEC to 
carry out their work of protecting the markets and the investing public. 
7.  The SEC Has Limited Resources to Carry Out Its Mission 
The SEC, unlike other government agencies, is not self-funded; the 
agency does not receive the fines it imposes, it receives a budget annually 
from Congress.392  Currently the SEC employs 4,200 employees, who 
monitor “more than 25,000 market participants, including broker-dealers, 
investment advisers, mutual funds and exchange traded funds, municipal 
advisors, clearing agents, transfer agents, and 18 exchanges.”393  In fact, the 
SEC budget has been cut recently, despite revenue produced from fines and 
penalties roughly doubling the prior year budget, and a twenty five percent 
budget increase proposed by the SEC Chair.394  Decreased budgets and 
limited staffing, combined with new laws, are increasing the SEC workload, 
further limiting it from carrying out its mission. 
The Commission’s ability to properly enforce the rules and protect the 
investing public is limited.395  Many incidents are not prosecuted due to 
limited SEC resources.396  Requiring the Commission to prove scienter for a 
Rule 13b2-2 contributes to the strain of an already underfunded agency, and 
is contrary to the congressional intent both in creating the Commission, but 
also more importantly is contrary to the purpose of enacting section 303 of 
Sarbanes-Oxley. 
8.  Directors and Officers Can Be Protected for Good Faith 
Misstatements 
Corporations can purchase insurance to protect directors and officers 
of the company from personal liability.397  Known as “D&O Insurance,” 
these policies can cover the cost of litigation, and financial liability for 
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losses, and even civil penalties if they are covered by the policy.398  More 
importantly, while these policies protect against accusations of breach of 
fiduciary duty, they generally do not cover intentional fraud or violations of 
“statutes, rules, and regulations.”399  From a policy perspective, this is 
important; while the SEC has stated that good faith misstatements and 
omissions are not actionable, any claims brought would be covered by the 
policy for the cost of defense from the time the suit is initiated, unless the 
fraud provision applies.400  The fraud provision of the policy incentivizes 
directors and officers to avoid intentionally disseminating fraudulent 
information or violating securities rules and laws by denying coverage if 
fraud is determined by a final adjudication.401 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In the early 1940’s, the president of a company in Boston was telling 
his shareholders that his company, which had quadrupled its earnings, was 
doing poorly, so that he could purchase the stock from them at deflated 
prices.402  The SEC drafted a rule to forbid this type of fraudulent activity, 
which became Rule 10b-5, which was passed without comment or debate, 
save for one commissioner, Sumner Pike, who quipped, “Well, we are 
against fraud, aren’t we?”403  The question of whether the SEC should be 
required to prove scienter to enforce Rule 13b2-2 can be answered with that 
same rhetorical question. 
Unfortunately, it is not that simple.  But, fortunately, legal analysis and 
discussion of policy issues brings us to the same result.  A look at the 
enabling statute shows that the language of Sarbanes-Oxley section 303(a) 
shows no intent to include a scienter requirement.  The Rule, as written, 
does not require the SEC to prove scienter.  The SEC is entitled to 
deference from the courts in their interpretation of any ambiguity in the 
Rule.  The SEC interprets the Rule to not require scienter. 
Case law analyzing SEC rules leads us to the same conclusion by 
comparing and contrasting cases.  The Supreme Court’s favorable decision 
in Capital Gains held that securities laws should be read broadly, enabling 
the SEC to prevent fraud.  The Hochfelder Court required scienter, but can 
be distinguished because it was ruling on a private action.  Aaron applied 
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the analysis in Hochfelder, requiring scienter for SEC enforcement actions 
of section 17(a), and binding later courts to the decision, or forcing them to 
distinguish from Aaron. 
Most importantly though are the analyses the Court used to arrive at 
these holdings, and the application of those analyses to Rule 13b2-2 to 
predict how the Court would rule.  The broad interpretation in Capital 
Gains, the private enforcement specified in Hochfelder, and the similarity 
of Rule 13b2-2 to the analysis of sections 17(a)(2) and (3) in Aaron, all lead 
to the conclusion that, if the Supreme Court were to grant certiorari to 
decide whether the SEC is required to prove the element of scienter in an 
enforcement action, it would rule in the negative. 
From a policy perspective, to require the SEC to prove scienter in a 
Rule 13b2-2 enforcement action is counter-intuitive.  The SEC was created 
to enact and enforce rules to instill confidence in the financial markets and 
to protect investors.  There is no pecuniary gain for the SEC in an 
enforcement action.  Any action taken by the Commission is in the best 
interest of investors and the financial markets.  To “tie its hands” by 
requiring it to prove the element of scienter in a 13b2-2 action is tantamount 
to providing a defense for any director or officer who misleads an auditor, 
except for the most egregious circumstances.  A negligence standard holds 
directors and officers to a standard that the investing public expects and 
deserves. 
 
 
